Our labour market forecast includes projections of labour market indicators in relation to the population aged 16 and over – i.e. all adults. Some headline labour market indicators published by the ONS are presented in relation to the population aged between 16 and the state pension age – i.e. working-age adults – for example, the employment rate is most commonly presented on this basis.

The indicators that we forecast include participation, and how it is split between employment and unemployment, and average weekly hours worked. Employment growth is an important driver of wages and salaries growth, which in turn drives the biggest sources of tax receipts: income tax and national insurance contributions. In addition, we forecast the claimant count measure of unemployment in order to ensure that our welfare spending forecast is consistent with our wider labour market judgements.

We produce a forecast for the potential growth rates of these headline labour market indicators in order to construct our potential output forecast. Once the output gap is closed, GDP is typically assumed to grow broadly in line with potential output over the remainder of the forecast period, and similarly the labour market variables are expected to move in line with our forecast for their underlying trends.

In the early part of the forecast, when output is typically assumed to be away from its potential level, we decompose the output gap into component gaps relating to the unemployment and participation rates, average hours and productivity. We consider this approach of estimating an overall output gap then decomposing it – rather than estimating component gaps and summing them to the total – to be the best use of the available information on the cyclical position of the economy, some of which relates to the overall output gap (e.g. inflation or wage growth) and some to the component gaps (e.g. capacity utilisation or recruitment difficulties).

As with the overall output gap, each of the individual component gaps represents the difference between the actual level of that component and its trend level. Our forecasts for the actual levels of each variable are produced by considering both the profile of the gaps and of the actual values, iterating as necessary until the BRC is comfortable that each element of the forecast is central.

We use a number of approaches to decompose the output gap, all involving a degree of judgement. These approaches can and do vary between forecasts. Beyond the short term, it is generally assumed that these variables gradually return to their underlying trend levels, with judgements about how the output cycle interacts with the labour market determining the speed at which each variable does so.

  • Adult population

    As described in the potential output section, we use ONS population projections as the basis for our population growth forecast. We currently use the ONS ‘principal’ population variant, which assumes net inward migration falls steadily to 185,000 by 2021. Because we make the same assumption for the potential and actual levels of population growth, we assume that there is no ’population gap’. This is because we generally take the view that population growth is not significantly affected by the economic cycle and therefore does not experience cyclical variability. This simplifying assumption means that we typically do not make any short-term adjustments to the ONS migration assumptions in light of cyclical movements in the economy, although it is possible that such effects will occur in practice.

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  • Participation

    The participation rate is the proportion of the population that is active in the labour force – that is they are either employed or unemployed and actively looking for work (i.e. they meet the LFS definition of unemployment).

    As discussed in the potential output section, our projection of the potential participation rate factors in the effect of changes in the age structure of the population. Our forecast for the actual participation rate starts from the latest ONS data and is informed by the momentum in the labour market and any leading indicators or monthly data that are available. Beyond the short-term, the actual rate is assumed to revert to our estimate of the potential participation rate over time.

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  • Unemployment

    Our unemployment forecast is based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) measure. The unemployment rate is expressed as the proportion of the active labour force that is unemployed – not the proportion of the adult population.

    As discussed in the potential output section, we estimate the equilibrium level of unemployment using an assessment of past trends in the unemployment rate in the UK, as well as recent labour market developments.

    When determining our forecast for the unemployment gap – and therefore the unemployment rate – we start by estimating the size of the gap at the beginning of the forecast period. We consider momentum in the labour market and use any leading indicators or monthly data that are available to determine our forecast for the unemployment rate in the short term. This could imply the estimated unemployment gap narrowing or widening, depending on the starting point and our broader judgements about near-term GDP growth prospects. We can then use estimates of the historic relationship between the output gap and the unemployment gap to determine how the unemployment rate will evolve until it reaches its equilibrium level.

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  • Employment

    Our forecast for employment comes from combining our forecasts for participation and unemployment because, by definition, the number of people participating in the labour market is equal to a sum of those in employment and those who are unemployed and actively seeking work. The BRC can therefore use this forecast as a way to sense check the rest of the labour market forecast by comparing it to our top-down judgements and leading indicators and the latest monthly data.

    We also consider how much of the total output gap may be associated with the labour market by, for example, looking at survey indicators of recruitment difficulties. Other proxies for labour market slack, such as average earnings growth, can also be used to evaluate the plausibility of the implied employment rate gap.

    In addition to the employment rate, the labour market forecast also includes projections of workforce jobs (because this is relevant to our forecast for national insurance contributions). This is a measure of the total number of jobs in the economy, rather than the number of people in employment, as some people have more than one job. The number of workforce jobs is typically assumed to grow broadly in line with employment, although we may depart from this convention if we judge this to be appropriate.

    Our forecast for total employment can also be decomposed into general government employment and market sector employment. The market sector is defined as the private sector plus public corporations while the general government sector is defined as the public sector less public corporations. This involves a mechanical decomposition, rather than the forecast itself being built up from separate forecasts for each element.

    We project general government employment by first assuming that the total government paybill will grow in line with a measure of current government spending. We also separately forecast government sector wage growth, taking into account recent data, stated Government policy (such as limits on pay growth), expected rates of pay drift and, over the medium term, prospects for whole economy earnings growth. We then combine total paybill and average wage growth to derive a projection of general government employment. Our forecast for market sector employment is then determined by residual.

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  • Average hours

    Readily available data show average hours have been steadily declining since the 1970s, while less complete data from earlier periods suggests that this continues a much longer trend. We typically project that long-term trend to continue. The current estimate of the average hours gap is based on a judgement that is informed by recent evidence, including surveys of desired levels of working hours and the difference between actual hours and usual hours reported in the Labour Force Survey.

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  • Productivity

    Our forecast for average hours is combined with our employment forecast to give a projection for total hours worked. This in turn acts as the denominator in our forecast for productivity (on an output-per-hour basis). Given the importance of the productivity growth assumption in our economy forecast more generally, it is important that our average hours forecast is consistent with our top-down judgement on the likely path of productivity over the forecast period.

    As with other elements of the labour market forecast, the actual rate of productivity growth is based on our forecast for trend productivity growth and the productivity ‘gap’, which we generally assume to move in line with the output gap.

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  • Claimant count

    As well as the LFS measure of unemployment, we also forecast the level of the claimant count. The claimant count measures the total number of people claiming unemployment related benefits and is therefore one of the determinants of our welfare spending forecast. Since May 2013, this has included all jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) claimants and out of work universal credit (UC) claimants. We produce a claimant count forecast to ensure that our welfare spending forecast is consistent with our broader labour market forecast.

    In general, we assume that the claimant count moves broadly in line with unemployment. Government policies that are likely to move people from claiming other types of benefits to claiming JSA/UC (such as the lone parent obligation, one effect of which is to move some claimants from income support onto JSA/UC) can also have a significant bearing on the claimant count. Over the medium term, we generally assume that the claimant count gradually returns to a level consistent with our judgement of its steady-state relationship with LFS unemployment under prevailing policy settings.

    The rollout of UC is expected to broaden the coverage of the claimant count. To prevent any double counting in our fiscal forecast, we continue to forecast the claimant count as if this change was not happening – focusing on those on jobseekers’ allowance and its equivalents in UC. Our forecast is therefore likely to be below the published ONS series, which the ONS has in any case announced will be dropped from the monthly labour market statistical bulletin as it ceases to be a reliable indicator during the UC rollout.

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